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THE DEAN FRED F. HERZOG MEMORIAL
LECTURE
INTERNATIONAL PROSECUTION OF
HEADS OF STATE FOR GENOCIDE, WAR
CRIMES, AND CRIMES AGAINST
HUMANITY
DR. HANS CORELL,
AMBASSADOR*

CHICAGO
16 SEPTEMBER 2009
Dean Corkery,
Professor Berendt and members of the Herzog Memorial
Lecture Committee,
Mr. David Herzog, representing the Herzog family,
Distinguished colleagues, and Fellow students,
First of all, I would like to thank the members of the
Memorial Lecture Committee for inviting me to deliver this year's
lecture in honor of Dean Fred Herzog.
I regret that I never met Dean Herzog in person. But it was
interesting to read about him, including about his two years as a
refugee in my country Sweden before he came to the United
States. His wise words quoted in the invitation to this lecture are
so very true: "A good teacher never stops learning."
As a matter of fact, what I enjoy the most at present after all
my years in public service at the national and international level
are my contacts with academia and students-and the freedom of
becoming a student again.
The members of the Memorial Lecture Committee have
invited me to speak on the topic "InternationalProsecution of

Heads of State for Genocide, War Crimes, and Crimes Against
Humanity." In addition, they have encouraged me to go beyond

Former Under-Secretary-General for Legal Affairs and the Legal Counsel of
the United Nations.
*
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the international law questions and also address the diplomatic as
well as political issues associated with the topic.
I will be pleased to do so, not only because of my involvement
in connection with the establishment of the International Criminal
Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) in 1993, the
International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) in 1994, the
Special Court for Sierra Leone (SCSL) in 2002, the Extraordinary
Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia (ECCC) in 2003, and the
adoption of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court
(ICC) in 1998. What is more important is that the possibility of
bringing Heads of State to justice at the international level is an
indispensable
ingredient in a multilateral rules-based
international system.
I will address the topic in four distinct parts:
-

The duties of Heads of State;

International prosecution of Heads of State;
Political issues-in particular the role of the UN Security
Council; and
- The role of the United States of America.
In the last part, I will focus on the opportunity for the present
U.S. administration to adopt new policies regarding engagement
in the international justice system, particularly the processes of
the ICC.
-

-

THE DUTIES OF HEADS OF STATE

With respect to the first part, the duties of Heads of State, it
is important to note that such officials may have very different
standing under the constitutions of their respective countries. In
case the question of criminal responsibility of a Head of State
arises, it is therefore important to analyze the legal status of this
official at the national level.
In so doing, one finds that there are Heads of State ranging
from the dictator with absolute power to the King or Queen in a
constitutional monarchy, where the Head of State has mostly
ceremonial functions. This does not mean that a Head of State of
the latter category is beyond reach for international justice.
However, this category is certainly different from a Head of State
with executive powers, who is perhaps also the supreme
commander of the armed forces of his or her country.
An analysis of the competence of a Head of State could in a
particular case lead to the conclusion that it is not this official but
the Head of Government who should be brought to justice, in case
punishment for international crimes should be meted out at the
highest level.
If we look to the more general duties of a Head of State,
irrespective of how the role of this highest official is defined, his or
her duty would be to look after the interests of the State and its
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State sovereignty is in this context an important
nationals.
element. It is often said that State sovereignty in a modern
society must be exercised in the interests of the people, not in the
interest of the sovereign, and that this must be done in conformity
with international law, particularly in the field of human rights.
At the international level, State sovereignty must be
exercised in conformity with international law, customary law, as
well as treaty law. The principle that agreements must be
observed-pacta sunt servandal-isone of the cornerstones in this
context.
Among international treaties, the Charter of the United
Nations (UN) must be singled out for several reasons. First, this
treaty, which was negotiated by politicians and personalities with
experiences of two world wars, now has global acceptance. The
UN membership now stands at 192 States. 2
The Charter is sometimes criticized for reflecting the
geopolitical situation of 1945. This is of course true, but the
Charter should be read with humility and with sensitivity to the
wisdom that it contains. A particular feature in that context is
Article 103, which basically means that the Charter trumps
obligations under other international agreements in the event that
there is a conflict between those obligations and the obligations
under the Charter. 3
Of particular importance in our analysis are also the
provisions in the Charter that refer to protection of human rights
and prohibit the threat or use of force against the territorial
integrity of other States. The use of force is allowed in only two
situations: in self-defence or after authorization by the Security
Council. It is obvious that among the duties of a Head of State is
to see to it that his or her country does not violate these rules,
adopted primarily for the purpose of maintaining international
peace and security.
An important development in later years is the adoption by
the UN General Assembly in September 2005 of the World
Summit Outcome (resolution A/RES/60/1). In this resolution, the
General Assembly clearly states (paragraph 138) that "[e]ach
individual State has the responsibility to protect its populations
from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against
humanity."4 The Assembly then declares (paragraph 139) that the

BLACK'S LAW
"Agreements must be kept."
1. Literal translation:
DICTIONARY 1140 (8th ed. 2004).
2. List of current members available at http://www.un.org/en/members/.
3. "In the event of a conflict between the obligations of the Members of the
United Nations under the present Charter and their obligations under any
other international agreement, their obligations under the present Charter
shall prevail." U.N. Charter art. 103.
4. G.A. Res. 60/1, 4 138, U.N. Doc. A/RES/60/1 (Oct. 24, 2005).
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UN Members "are prepared to take collective action, in a timely
and decisive manner, through the Security Council, in accordance
with the Charter, including Chapter VII, on a case-by-case basis
and in cooperation with relevant regional organizations as
appropriate, should peaceful means be inadequate and national
authorities are manifestly failing to protect their populations from
genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing, and crimes against
humanity."5 This provision was reaffirmed by the Security
Council in resolution 1674 (2006) of 28 April 2006.6
In a very carefully worded report in January 2009 (A/63/677):
"Implementing the responsibility to protect," the SecretaryGeneral of the United Nations stated that "it would be
counterproductive, and possibly even destructive, to try to revisit
the negotiations that led to the provisions of paragraphs 138 and
139 of the Summit Outcome. Those provisions represent a
remarkably good outcome, which will well serve the ultimate
purpose of the responsibility to protect: to save lives by preventing
the most egregious mass violations of human rights, while
reinforcing the letter and spirit of the Charter and the abiding
principles of responsible sovereignty."7
I believe that the Secretary-General is right. However, this is
a field of international law that is developing, and the main organs
of the United Nations, among them the Security Council, construe
the Charter independently. Looking to the future, it is therefore
important to keep in mind that, from a legal point of view, the
Council is not restricted to the situations enumerated in the
General Assembly resolution but is free to make its own
assessment. I will revert to this matter in the third part of my
presentation.
The duty of a Head of State in this context is to see to it that
the population in his or her country is protected from the crimes
with which we are concerned here.
In short, the ultimate duty to ascertain that the responsibility
to protect is upheld at the national level rests with the Head of
State or Government. The famous sign that President Truman
kept on his desk comes to mind: "The Buck Stops Here."
INTERNATIONAL PROSECUTION OF HEADS OF STATE

I now come to the second part of my lecture: international

prosecution of Heads of State.
It should first be noted that different attempts to establish
international criminal justice have been made in the past.
However, for the purpose of this lecture it is sufficient to focus on
5. G.A. Res. 60/1,

139, U.N. Doc. A/RES/60/1 (Oct. 24, 2005).

6. S.C. Res. 1674, U.N. Doc. SIRES/1674 (2006).
7. G.A. Res. 63/677, 67, U.N. Doc. A/RES/63/677 (Jan. 12, 2009).
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the last 20 years, in particular since the development during this
period has been remarkable.
In addition to the special tribunals already mentioned-the
ICTY, the ICTR, the SCSL, and the Extraordinary Chambers in
the Courts of Cambodia-the Special Tribunal for Lebanon should
be noted.
Except for the Cambodian ECCC that constitute
international assistance to strengthen national courts, all these
tribunals are efforts to establish international justice on an ad hoc
basis.
As a point of departure we must first note that Heads of State
or Government and other State officials have personal immunity
from civil or criminal jurisdiction at the national level in another
State in accordance with customary international law. This is
clearly explained by the International Court of Justice in its

judgment in the Case Concerning the Arrest Warrant of 11 April
2000 (Democratic Republic of the Congo v. Belgium).8 Reference is
made in particular to paragraphs 51-55 of the judgement, which
concerned immunity of a Minister for Foreign Affairs from
criminal jurisdiction.9
However, this principle does not apply with respect to
international criminal justice. By way of example, the statutes of
the ICTY (Article 7 (2))1o and ICTR (Article 6 (2))"

contain

provisions according to which the official position of any accused
person, whether as Head of State or Government shall not relieve
such person of criminal responsibility nor mitigate punishment.
In this context, it is important to note that no incumbent
Head of State has been brought to justice before these tribunals.
However, former Heads of State have been brought to justice.
Regretfully, the case against Slobodan Milosevic before the ICTY
could not be brought to an end because of the fact that the
defendant died. But the former President of Liberia Charles
Taylor now stands trial before the SCSL. Irrespective of the
outcome of this trial-needless to say, the Court has to observe
scrupulously the standards that must be applied in criminal
proceedings, including the presumption of innocence-it will be of
great importance. It will attest to the fact that persons at this
level are not immune from standing trial.
It is important to keep in mind that the tribunals mentioned

8. Case Concerning the Arrest Warrant of 11 April 2000 (Democratic
Republic of the Congo v. Belgium), 2002 I.C.J. 121 (Feb. 14), available at
http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/3c6cd39b4.html.
9. Id. TT 51-55.
10. Updated Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former
Yugoslavia art. 7, F 2 (2009), available at http://www.ictr.org/ENGLISH/
basicdocs/statute/2007.pdf.
11. Statute for the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda art. 6, T 2
(2007), availableat http://www.ictr.org/ENGLISH/basicdocs/statute/2007.pdf.
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now are temporary arrangements. In a few years' time they will
no longer be in operation. Let us therefore focus on the Rome
Statute of the International Criminal Court and the ICC.
The first provision we should focus on is Article 27 of the
Statute on "Irrelevance of Official Capacity." It reads as follows:
1. This Statute shall apply equally to all persons without any
distinction based on official capacity. In particular, official capacity
as a Head of State or Government, a member of a Government or
parliament, an elected representative or a Government official shall
in no case exempt a person from criminal responsibility under this
Statute, nor shall it, in and of itself, constitute a ground for
reduction of sentence.
2. Immunities or special procedural rules which may attach to the
official capacity of a person, whether under national or international
law, shall not bar the Court from exercising its jurisdiction over
such a person. 12
As it appears, the first paragraph addresses the question of
immunity in the same manner as the statutes of the ICTY and
ICTR. The second paragraph makes it crystal clear that there is
no right to invoke personal immunity before the ICC.
In paragraph 61 of the judgement in the Case Concerning the
Arrest Warrant of 11 April 2000, the International Court of Justice

makes express reference to these provisions:
Accordingly, the immunities enjoyed under international law by an
incumbent or former Minister for Foreign Affairs do not represent a
bar to criminal prosecution in certain circumstances.
Fourthly, an incumbent or former Minister for Foreign Affairs may
be subject to criminal proceedings before certain international
criminal courts, where they have jurisdiction. Examples include the
International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, and the
International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, established pursuant
to Security Council resolutions under Chapter VII of the United
Nations Charter, and the future International Criminal Court
created by the 1998 Rome Convention.
The latter's Statute
expressly provides, in Article 27, paragraph 2, that "[i]mmunities or
special procedural rules which may attach to the official capacity of
a person, whether under national or international law, shall not bar
the Court from exercising its jurisdiction over such a person."1 3
Let us now look at the jurisdiction of the ICC. The ICC is
limited to address the most serious crimes of concern to the
12. Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court art. 27 (1998),

availableat http://www.icc-cpi.int/NR/rdonlyres/EA9AEFF7-5752-4F84-BE940
A655EB30E16/0/RomeStatuteEnglish.pdf.

13. Case Concerning the Arrest Warrant of 11 April 2000 (Democratic
Republic of the Congo v. Belgium), 1 61.
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international community as a whole.
They are the crimes
enumerated in the title of my presentation: genocide, crimes
against humanity, and war crimes. The crime of aggression is
indicated in the Rome Statute but is not yet defined.
It should be noted that in addition to the provisions on
genocide and war crimes in the Rome Statute there are separate
conventions that regulate those crimes. There is no corresponding
convention on crimes against humanity. An effort is presently
made to encourage States to adopt such a convention. I recognize
one of the initiators of this initiative in the audience, Professor
Cherif Bassiouni.
Article 13 of the Rome Statute addresses the conditions under
which the ICC may exercise its jurisdiction.14 From this provision
follows that jurisdiction can be exercised in three situations. First,
a State Party may refer to the Prosecutor a situation in which one
or more of the crimes just mentioned appears to have been
committed in its territory or by one of its nationals. Second, the
Security Council acting under Chapter VII of the UN Charter may
refer to the Prosecutor a situation in which one or more of such
crimes appears to have been committed. Third, the Prosecutor
may initiate an investigation in respect of such a crime in
accordance with Article 15 of the Rome Statute.
What immediately comes to mind here is the indictment of
Sudan's President Omar Hassan al-Bashir on charges of war
crimes and crimes against humanity. In this case, the ICC is
acting at the request of the Security Council in accordance with
Article 13 (b) of the Rome Statute, i.e. the second situation just
referred to.
On 23 June 2009, I had the privilege of addressing the
Stockholm Criminology Symposium under the title 'Addressing
5
Impunity: How United Are the Nations?"1
In so doing, I focused
on the specific situation that obtains after the indictment of the
Sudanese Head of State. I reiterate what I said then, namely that
the indictment of President al-Bashir is now above all a matter for
the Security Council. It is a common principle that if one embarks
on a certain course of action one should also be prepared to follow
suit and face the consequences. Therefore, when the Council
asked the ICC to address the situation in Sudan, the Council
should also have realized that the evidence might lead the

14. Rome Statute, art. 13.
15. Hans Corell, An Address to the Stockholm Criminology Symposium
Plenary Session on "Nations United Against the Victimization of Mankind,"
Addressing Impunity-How United Are the Nations? (June 23, 2009), in 53
DEVELOPMENT DIALOGUE: RESPONSES TO MASS VIOLENCE-MEDIATION,
PROTECTION, AND PROSECUTION 11-25 (Dag Hammarskjbld Foundation Nov.
2009).
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Prosecutor to the very highest level.
It goes without saying that President al-Bashir is entitled to
the presumption of innocence. But if indicted, he should be
brought to justice. It is therefore tragic to see the inability of the
Council to act with consequence and determination in this matter.
Surely, one would expect the Council to follow suit with a
resolution ordering Sudan to comply with the arrest warrant.
Let me also reiterate that this situation goes to the very heart
of the Rome Statute and international criminal justice. If the
evidence leads in this direction, it is precisely persons at this level
that should be brought to justice. Through its inability to act in
consequence, the Security Council not only undermines its own
authority but also the authority of the ICC.
I will revert also to this issue in the third part of my
presentation.
One of the purposes of criminal law is that it should have a
preventive effect, both on the individual and in a general sense.
Unfortunately, criminal acts are a common feature of all societies,
and no society will ever be able to rid itself entirely of criminality.
However, if the criminal justice system does not work at the
national level, this is a recipe for lawlessness, even anarchy. I
recall the tremendous difficulties that the United Nations
encountered when the Organization -was charged with governing
Kosovo and East Timor. It takes time to establish a functioning
criminal justice system.
The same applies at the international level. No doubt, there
are those who criticize the efforts so far to administer criminal
justice at that level. But we should keep in mind that we are only
at the beginning of a very arduous process. It is therefore
important that the present efforts continue in a systematic and
persistent manner. Let us hope that those entrusted with the
administration of the system realize the magnitude of their
responsibility. The world community simply cannot afford to fail
when we have come this far.
No doubt, the more systematic and effective international
criminal justice becomes, the more impact it will have on the
behaviour at all levels within States. This should be the case, in
particular, with respect to officials at the level of Head of State or
Government if they become the focus of the process. But in order
to achieve this result, there must be a true political commitment
behind the effort.
A question that comes to the forefront here is how the
responsibility of a Head of State is engaged. If it is this person
that takes the lead in orchestrating the atrocities, the criminal
responsibility is obvious. The question is more complex if the
Head of State is not directly involved.
An important provision in this context is Article 28 of the
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Rome Statute. According to subparagraph (b) of this Article:
. . . [A] superior shall be criminally responsible for crimes within the
jurisdiction of the Court committed by subordinates under his or her
effective authority and control, as a result of his or her failure to
exercise control properly over such subordinates, where:
(i)

The superior either knew, or consciously disregarded
information which clearly indicated, that the
subordinates were committing or about to commit such
crimes;

(ii)

The crimes concerned activities that were within the
effective responsibility and control of the superior; and

(iii)

The superior failed to take all necessary and reasonable
measures within his or her power to prevent or repress
their commission or to submit the matter to the
competent
authorities
for
investigation
and
prosecution.16

Time does not allow for an in-depth examination of this issue
here. Suffice it to indicate that superior authorities, whether
military or civilian, may be responsible for crimes committed by
their subordinates under certain conditions. This means that the
criminal responsibility of a Head of State could be engaged, e.g., if
he or she passively observes how military commanders violate the
laws of war.
By way of example, if it is widely reported that the armed
forces of a State use illegal weapons or engage in indiscriminate
bombings that cause great civilian losses, the criminal
responsibility of the Head of State can be engaged if it is later
established that the events occurred and that the State's principal
officer did not order the military to stop these criminal acts.
POLITICAL ISSUES-IN PARTICULAR THE
ROLE OF THE UN SECURITY COUNCIL

This brings me to the third part of my presentation: political
issues-in particular the role of the UN Security Council.
To establish international criminal justice is an extremely
sensitive issue from a political point of view. The United Nations
is based on the principle of the sovereign equality of all its
Members. Bringing officials of a State before an international
criminal court is viewed by many as an infringement of the
sovereignty of the State. However, gradually Governments have
come to the conclusion that bringing perpetrators of international
crimes to justice is necessary in order to maintain or restore
international peace and security.
The responsibility for bringing such perpetrators to justice
16. Id. art. 28(b).
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rests with the world community. No organization could assume
this responsibility with greater legitimacy than the United
Nations. It was also under the auspices of the UN that the Rome
Statute of the International Criminal Court was negotiated. The
ICC is not a UN organ, but there is a close connection between the
Court and the UN.
A relationship agreement between the two entered into force
on 22 July 2004 as foreseen in Article 2 of the Rome Statute.7
The responsibility for the administration of the ICC is a matter for
the Assembly of States Parties and, obviously, for the organs of the
Court in accordance with the Rome Statute. But the ICC needs
the support not only of the States Parties but of all the Members of
the UN.
This is so, in particular since the ICC is dependent on the
collaboration of authorities at the national level to be able to
perform its functions. It is of extreme importance that such
cooperation is forthcoming.
Cooperation with the ICC can be expected in cases where the
State itself has referred a situation to the Court. The first
experience of such cooperation will be in the three African StatesUganda, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, and the Central
African Republic-all parties to the Rome Statute, where the ICC
is engaged at present on the basis of requests from those States.
The situation in Kenya, a party to the Rome Statute, should
also be followed with great attention. The post-election violence in
that country in early 2008 has now become a matter for the ICC.
The intention was that Kenya should deal with this situation on
her own through a national special court as proposed by the
Commission of Inquiry into Post-Election Violence (CIPEV), the
so-called Waki Commission. But the steps proposed by the
Commission are long overdue, and in early July 2009 the
chairman of the Panel of Eminent African Personalities, former
UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan, handed over a sealed envelope
entrusted to the Panel by the Waki Commission to the ICC
Prosecutor.
The envelope contained the names of alleged
perpetrators of the post-election atrocities.
Let us now revert to the general issue: if the ICC is not
supported in an effective and efficient manner by the States
concerned, the Court needs backing from entities that are in a
position to assist. The obvious example is the Security Council
with its powers under Chapter VII of the UN Charter.
In cases where the Council has asked the ICC Prosecutor to
address a situation, the evident conclusion is that the Council has
an obligation to support the ICC. It is against this background
that it is so sad to note the Council's inability to act in
17. Id. art.2.
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consequence with its request to ask the ICC Prosecutor to address
the situation in Sudan when President al-Bashir was indicted.
An important element here is the reference in Article 13 (b) of
the Rome Statute to Chapter VII of the UN Charter.18 Article 39,
which appears in this Chapter, reads as follows (the references to
Articles 41 and 42 imply non-use of force and use of force,
respectively): "The Security Council shall determine the existence
of any threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression
and shall make recommendations, or decide what measures shall
be taken in accordance with Articles 41 and 42, to maintain or
restore international peace and security."19
It is on the basis of Chapter VII that the Council established
the ICTY and the ICTR. The same Chapter applies in situations
where the Council contemplates referring a situation to the ICC
Prosecutor. The Council therefore has to make a determination in
accordance with Article 39 and decide whether a request to the
ICC Prosecutor is necessary to maintain or restore international
peace and security.
It is also against this background that paragraph 139 of the
Summit Outcome, previously mentioned, should be read.
Obviously, the provision in the resolution by the General Assembly
is of great importance when the Council is considering how to
address a particular situation. But, as I just said, the Council
construes the Charter independently and is therefore not
restricted to the situations enumerated in the General Assembly
resolution but is free to make its own assessment as to when it is
necessary to exercise responsibility to protect under Chapter VII.
In this particular situation, where there is a direct correlation
between the crimes enumerated in the Rome Statute and the ones
enumerated in paragraph 139 of the Summit Outcome, there
should, however, be no potential for a conflict.
But what if there are objections to criminal pursuit? Surely,
bringing people at this level to justice risks aggravating the
situation! Will it not be more difficult to negotiate a peace
agreement between the warring parties? Is there not a risk that
the conflict is prolonged with continued human suffering for an
extended period of time? Should we not listen to the victims?
What if they are more interested in peace now than in bringing
perpetrators to justice?
Such objections can certainly not be disregarded.
It is
therefore important to analyze each particular situation carefully.
But at the same time, it is equally important to remember that if
the officials who bear the greatest responsibility for international
crimes committed in a particular situation are not brought to

18. Id. art. 13(b).
19. U.N. Charter art. 39.
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justice, this constitutes a clear risk not only for a continuation of
the conflict at hand, but also for breeding new conflicts in the
future.
There is also a growing realization that if officials at the
highest level in a State are suspected of international crimes,
these persons soon become a burden to their own country. If the
State community joins hands and takes coordinated action against
such a State, the situation could change very quickly.
In such a situation there is also a role for civil society, not
least the business community. To do business with a State or with
entities within a State where the highest officials are suspected of
crimes of the kind we are discussing here and where the State
does not cooperate with the international tribunal would not be in
conformity with the Global Compact or with Corporate Social
Responsibility. Such questions should be raised and discussed as
elements in the risk assessments that responsible businesses
make in today's world.
However, one cannot disregard the fact that there could be
situations where pursuing criminal charges against the highest
officials of a State might have very serious consequences and even
constitute additional threats to international peace and security.
It is against this background that the Rome Statute contains a
provision on deferral of investigation or prosecution. It reads as
follows (Article 16):
No investigation or prosecution may be commenced or proceeded
with under this Statute for a period of 12 months after the Security
Council, in a resolution adopted under Chapter VII of the Charter of
the United Nations, has requested the Court to that effect; that
request may be renewed by the Council under the same conditions. 20
This provision constitutes a safety clause to prevent the
possibility that a prosecution before the ICC in a particular case
would lead to unacceptable consequences. From the Prosecutor's
point of view this is a very important provision. The Prosecutor
must go where the evidence leads him or her and should not have
to make decisions of the kind contemplated in Article 16. That
provision entails a political assessment for which the Security
Council must be responsible.
This system means that the
Prosecutor can focus on the criminal justice elements without
being accused of acting on the basis of political considerations.
Correspondingly, Article 16 requires that the Security Council
applies this provision in an unbiased and credible manner. This is
another element in the analysis that the Council should make of
its own performance. I have explained my concerns about the
Council's performance in a letter to the Members of the UN of 10

December 2008-Security Council Reform: Rule of Law More
20. Rome Statute, art. 16.
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Important Than Additional Members. 21
Of particular importance is that the Security Council abides
by the same standards when it applies the UN Charter.
Otherwise, the Council will be accused of using double standards.
The Council has asked the ICC Prosecutor to address the situation
in Sudan. Why did not the Council do the same in the Middle
East?
At a manifestation for peace between Israel and Palestine,
held in Stockholm on the 10 January 2009, I said that I could not
see that the situation in the Middle East is different from other
situations where the State community has come together to
ascertain that suspected war crimes are investigated and that
those responsible are brought to justice. Pointing to both Israel
and the Palestine Authority, I said that the accusations made in
different directions must be investigated in a professional manner
so that all, and not least those directly affected, can have an
answer to the question where the responsibility lies.
Yesterday, the United Nations Fact Finding Mission on the
Gaza Conflict issued its report. It is horrifying reading. The
Mission recommends (paragraph 1969 (c)) that, in the absence of
good faith investigations by the appropriate Israeli authorities, the
Security Council should refer the situation in Gaza to the ICC
Prosecutor pursuant to Article 13 (b) of the Rome Statute. 22
THE ROLE OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

This brings me to the fourth and last part of my presentation:
the role of the United States of America.
It is with great sorrow that many friends of the U.S. around
the world have followed the development with respect to the rule
of law in your country in later years. This is true in particular of
people of my generation in Europe, who look to the U.S. as a friend
that twice came to our rescue in the last century.
On earlier occasions, I have quoted a critical remark by
Nicholas Rostow, who was the General Counsel to the U.S. mission
to the United Nations during the period 2001-2005, and with
whom I had many contacts at the time. I will quote him also today
in reflecting on the opportunity for the present U.S.
administration to adopt new policies regarding engagement in the
international justice system, particularly the processes of the ICC.
In an article entitled "Law Abiding-Restoring America's
21. Letter from Dr. Hans Corell to the Governments of the Members of the
United Nations, "Security Council Reform: Rule of Law More Important Than
Additional Members" (Dec. 10, 2008), availableat http://www.havc.se/res/
SelectedMaterial/200812 10corelllettertounmembers.pdf.
22. HUmAN RIGHTS IN PALESTINE AND OTHER OCCUPIED ARAB
TERRITORIES, REPORT OF THE UNITED NATIONS FACT-FINDING MISSION ON
THE GAZA CONFLICT, ' 1969(c), U.N. Doc. A/HRC/12/48 (Sept. 25, 2009).
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Global Reputation," Nicholas Rostow says: "So whatever one may
think about the nature of international law, the next
administration will have to address the sullied international legal
image of the United States. To prepare for this task, we should
review the record." 23
I can recommend this article for reading. A few days ago I
also read with great interest the manuscript of a book that will be
published later this year and in which ten former Legal Advisers
to the State Department discuss their experiences from serving
different U.S. administrations. 24
Nowadays, I never miss an opportunity to emphasize that the
only way ahead is a multilateral rules-based system. The Western
democracies obviously must take the lead in establishing this
system. If they do not set the example, how can they expect other
States in less fortunate circumstances to bow to the law?
Great efforts are made by many, not least by American
organizations, to assist States in establishing systems under the
rule of law at the national level. However, this is not the occasion
to go into detail about this work. Let us instead look at the
international criminal justice system.
One conclusion from the history of the establishment of the
international criminal tribunals is that the U.S. has been very
supportive of these efforts and sometimes the main engineer. It
was therefore with great regret that many of us took note of the
U.S. vote against the adoption of the ICC Statute in Rome on 17
July 1998.25
It is a well-known fact that in spite of this vote, the Statute
was signed by the Clinton administration on 31 December 2000
and that the signature was withdrawn by the Bush administration
in 2002.
Less known, perhaps, is that the Bush administration
adopted a very aggressive policy against the ICC. As an example,
it should be mentioned its efforts to undermine the ICC by putting
pressure on other States to sign bilateral non-surrender
agreements under Article 98 of the Rome Statute. The purpose of
these "Article 98 Agreements" was to protect U.S. nationals from
the assertion of ICC jurisdiction by prohibiting the other State
from surrendering U.S. nationals to the ICC.

23. Nicholas Rostow, Law Abiding: Restoring America's Global Reputation,
THE AMERICAN INTEREST, Jan./Feb. 2008, at 81.
24. See ICHAEL P. SCHARF & PAUL R. WILLIAMS, SHAPING FOREIGN
POLICY IN TIMES OF CRISIS: THE ROLE OF INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE STATE
DEPARTMENT LEGAL ADVISER (Cambridge Univ. Press 2010).

25. "Only 7 nations voted against the treaty (including the United States,
Israel, China, Iraq, Qatar), while 21 countries abstained." Coalition for the
International Criminal Court, History of the ICC, Rome Conference, available
at http://www.iccnow.org/?mod=rome.
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It should be noted, however, that toward the end of the Bush
administration the attitude with respect to the ICC changed
somewhat. For example, on 31 March 2005 the U.S. decided not to
block the adoption of the Security Council resolution that referred
the situation in Darfur (Sudan) to the ICC Prosecutor.
Furthermore, in July 2008, the U.S. opposed efforts of other States
to apply Article 16 of the Rome Statute and defer the investigation
and prosecution of President al-Bashir.
Under all circumstances, it is now crucial that the new U.S.
administration adopts a radically different position vis-a-vis the
ICC even if this will not be easy.
In reflecting on the opportunity for the Obama administration
to adopt new policies regarding engagement in the international
criminal justice system, I do not want to be presumptuous when
there is an authoritative American proposal in this respect on the
table. I refer to the report, released in March 2009 by an
independent task force, established by the American Society of
International Law, the Task Force on U.S. Policy Toward the
International Criminal Court (ICC).26 It was co-chaired by former
State Department Legal Adviser William H. Taft IV and Judge
Patricia M. Wald.
The Task Force believes that there is an auspicious
opportunity to put U.S. relations with the Court on an articulated
course of positive engagement and recommends that President
Obama take prompt steps to announce a policy of continued
positive engagement with the Court. It should be noted, however,
that the Task Force does not recommend a U.S. ratification of the
Rome Statute at present.
The Task Force makes several recommendations. To an
external observer the following are of particular interest:
- Examination of methods by which the United States can support
important criminal investigations of the ICC, including cooperation
on the arrest of fugitive defendants, the provision of diplomatic
support, and the sharing of information, as well as ways in which it
can cooperate with the ICC in the prevention and deterrence of
genocide, war crimes, and crimes against humanity;
- U.S. participation as an observer in the Assembly of States Parties
to the Rome Statute, including discussions on the crime of
aggression and the 2010 Review Conference of the Rome Statute;
- U.S. development assistance focused on rule-of-law capacity
building, including that which enables countries to exercise their
complementary jurisdiction to the ICC effectively;

26. REPORT OF AN INDEPENDENT TASK FORCE CONVENED BY THE AMERICAN
SOCIETY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW, U.S. POLICY TOWARD THE INTERNATIONAL
CRIMINAL COURT: FURTHERING POSITIVE ENGAGEMENT (Mar. 2009), available

at http://www.asil.org/files/ASIL-08-DiscPaper2.pdf.
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- An inter-agency policy review to re-examine whether, in light of
the ICC's further performance and the outcome of the 2010 Review
Conference, to recommend to Congress that the United States
become a party to the Rome Statute with any appropriate provisos,
understandings, and declarations similar to those adopted by other
States Parties;
- Consideration of amendment to U.S. law to permit full domestic
U.S. prosecution of crimes within the jurisdiction of the ICC so as to
ensure the primacy of U.S. jurisdiction over the Court's jurisdiction
under the complementarity regime.
With respect to the "Article 98 Agreements," the Task Force
recommends that the President should examine U.S. policy
concerning their scope, applicability, and implementation and that
receipt of certain U.S. assistance should be further de-linked from
any such agreements.
On a more general note, it cannot be emphasized enough how
important it is that the U.S. establishes itself as a bulwark for
democracy and the rule of law. The best way to do this is to
respect international law and to support a multilateral rules-based
international system. There are many in the U.S. and around the
world who hope that the new administration will be able to make a
difference here.
A positive signal would also be sent if thorough investigations
could be made so that the responsibility for the violations of both
U.S. and international law that occurred during the previous
administration could be clearly established. If, for example, it is
established that the United States of America engaged in
systematic torture of prisoners or captives, it is important for the
U.S. credibility as a State under the rule of law that it is clarified
at what level this was authorized and that those responsible are
brought to justice.
Yet another opportunity to demonstrate a commitment to
international criminal justice will be the aftermath of the report
by the United Nations Fact Finding Mission on the Gaza Conflict.
In fact, because of its actions over many years, the U.S. bears a
great responsibility for the present situation in the Middle East.
Depending on how things unfold, the new U.S. administration may
have an opportunity to demonstrate that it applies the same
standards in the Middle East with respect to accountability as it
does in other parts of the world.
In conclusion, let me reiterate that the possibility of bringing
officials at the level of Head of State or Government to justice at
the international level is a necessary ingredient in a rules-based
international society. Reason being, it is at this level that the
principal standards applied in conflicts where international crimes
may be committed are set. It is at this level where the overriding
orders are given.
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In other words, in order to establish international criminal
justice it is necessary to examine whether the evidence leads to the
place where in the specific situation the buck stops. Surely, this
expression is understood also in the Middle East, in Sudan, in
Zimbabwe, in Burma, and in other parts of the world.
Thank you for your attention!

